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This working paper presents the preliminary findings of a detailed empirical study of court proceedings 
brought by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and the Commonwealth Director 
of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) for breach of directors’ duties provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
in the ten year period from 2005 to 2014.   
This study is the most in-depth empirical analysis of public enforcement of directors’ duties to date, 
examining the type, frequency and magnitude of sanctions imposed in civil and criminal proceedings, as 
well as the success rates, duration and reporting of such proceedings.  Its findings provide the foundation 
for evidence-based legal analysis and policy development in relation to this fundamental area of corporate 
regulation. 
Effective enforcement of directors’ duties is central to the wellbeing of Australia’s society, economy and 
environment.  Given the rapidly growing number of companies in Australia, with 2,292,624 companies 
registered as at November 2015, it is critical to ensure that companies are managed lawfully and 
responsibly.   As Justice Middleton commented in ASIC v Healey (2011) 196 FCR 291, “The role of a director 
is significant as their actions may have a profound effect on the community, and not just shareholders, 
employees and creditors.” 
Court action by ASIC and the CDPP plays a significant role in the enforcement of directors’ duties, being 
responsible for approximately half of all public and private proceedings involving breach of directors’ 
duties.  Australia’s public enforcement regime has attracted attention from overseas jurisdictions in 
relation to establishing, expanding or refining public regimes of their own.  Yet the effectiveness of 
penalties for corporate wrongdoing has also been called into question in recent times, with the Financial 
System Inquiry concluding that the “maximum civil and criminal penalties for contravening ASIC legislation 
should be substantially increased to act as a credible deterrent for large firms.”  The Senate Standing 
Committee on Economics is currently conducting an inquiry into the “inconsistencies and inadequacies of 
current criminal, civil and administrative penalties for corporate and financial misconduct or white-collar 
crime.”   
This working paper contributes towards an empirically informed discourse on the adequacy of penalties for 
corporate wrongdoing.  The following are some of the key trends identified in the paper. 
 Most previous commentary on enforcement of directors’ duties has focussed on the civil penalty 
regime, yet this paper shows that criminal enforcement of directors’ duties by the CDPP was 
significantly more prevalent than civil enforcement by ASIC.  Comparing directors’ duties that 
attract both civil and criminal liability, criminal enforcement by the CDPP was responsible for about 
81% of all matters in which liability was established and about 61% of all defendants found liable.     
 
 
 
 
 Much of the debate surrounding penalties for corporate wrongdoing has centred on the maximum 
pecuniary penalty of $200,000 in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).  However, this paper reveals that 
incapacitative sanctions, such as custodial sentences and civil management disqualification orders, 
were much more frequently imposed than pecuniary penalties.  Prison sentences and 
disqualification orders each accounted for about 33.50% of the total number of sanctions imposed 
(67% collectively), while about 18% of the sanctions were civil pecuniary penalties and only about 
2% were criminal fines. 
 While the statutory maximum civil pecuniary penalty is $200,000, this paper reveals that the 
penalties imposed by courts are typically much lower than the maximum.  The median civil 
pecuniary penalty imposed on defendants who had engaged in a single contravention of a 
directors’ duties provision was $25,000, which is only 12.50% of the statutory maximum.  The 
median penalty imposed on all defendants, including defendants who had engaged in multiple 
contraventions, was $50,000. 
 The average civil management disqualification order was about 5.2 years.  The average maximum 
prison sentence was about 2.25 years, while the average minimum (i.e. minimum amount of time 
that must be served) was about 1.4 years.  However, a significant proportion of prison sentences, 
about 46%, involved immediate release subject to a good behaviour bond. 
 Both ASIC and the CDPP enjoyed high litigation success rates.  Despite the higher standard of proof 
applicable to criminal proceedings for breach of directors’ duties, the CDPP’s success rates were 
not significantly lower than ASIC’s.  The CDPP and ASIC established liability in about 88% and 89% of 
matters respectively.  In terms of individual defendants, the CDPP and ASIC established liability in 
relation to about 84% and 92% of defendants respectively. 
 Contrary to a commonly held view that civil enforcement is more efficient than criminal 
enforcement, the duration of both the civil and criminal enforcement processes was lengthy.  From 
the first detected contravention to the final judgment, the average duration of civil matters was 
about 6.9 years, while the average duration of criminal matters was about 7.9 years.   
 
 
